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The present paper reviews the reactions and the path of acceptance of the theory known as ‘‘peak oil’’.
The theory was proposed for the first time by M.K. Hubbert in the 1950s as a way to describe the
production pattern of crude oil. According to Hubbert, the production curve is ‘‘bell shaped’’ and
approximately symmetric. Hubbert’s theory was verified with good approximation for the case of oil
production in the United States that peaked in 1971, and is now being applied to the worldwide oil
production. It is generally believed that the global peak of oil production (‘‘peak oil’’) will take place
during the first decade of the 21st century, and some analysts believe that it has already occurred in
2005 or 2006. The theory and its consequences have unpleasant social and economical implications. The
present paper is not aimed at assessing the peak date but offers a discussion on the factors that affect
the acceptance and the diffusion of the concept of ‘‘peak oil’’ with experts and with the general public.
The discussion is based on a subdivision of ‘‘four stages of acceptance’’, loosely patterned after a
sentence by Thomas Huxley.
& 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
‘‘Peak oil’’ is a term that summarizes the concept that the
production of crude oil—as well as that of most finite resources in
a market economy—grows, reaches a maximum (peak), and then
gradually declines to zero. This concept was expressed for the first
time by Marion King Hubbert in 1956 [1] and today the maximum
production is often termed ‘‘Hubbert’s peak’’. Hubbert had
proposed that the production curve is ‘‘bell shaped’’, that is
symmetric. In this case, the peak occurs when about half of a non-
renewable resource is extracted.
The mechanisms that lead to bell-shaped production curves
are by now well understood [2–4]. Initially, the extraction of an
abundant and cheap resource leads to economic growth and to
increasing investments in further extraction. Gradually, however,
the cheap resources are depleted and extraction costs become
higher because of the need of extracting lower quality deposits. In
time, investments cannot keep pace with these rising costs; the
growth slows down and, eventually, production starts declining.
Here, ‘‘costs’’ are to be understood in monetary terms but, at the
same time as energy costs which grow for physical reasons related
to the lower concentration and or lower quality of the resource. In
other words, what creates the bell curve for an energy resource as
oil is the variation with time of the net energy of extraction, alsoll rights reserved.known as ‘‘Energy Return on Energy Investment’’ (EROEI). [5] In
the case of oil, the EROEI effect is enhanced by physical factors
related to the fall in reservoir pressure and also with the fact that
less and less oil-bearing reservoir is in touch with the wells as the
oil is progressively extracted.
The worldwide Hubbert’s peak for crude oil (‘‘peak oil’’) is
expected to occur during the early decades of the 21st century [6].
It is often stated that peak oil is a turning point for humankind, a
‘‘rollover’’ that will cause dramatic changes in the world’s
economic and social system. The concept of peak oil is more
and more often mentioned in the media and it has caught the
imagination of the public. In general, the reaction to peak oil is not
different than that to any new idea, and we may say that it follows
a series of four phases, loosely patterned after a well known
sentence by Thomas Huxley ‘‘History warns us that it is the
customary fate of new truths to begin as heresies and to end as
superstitions.’’Phase 1: Never heard of it.
Phase 2: It is wrong.
Phase 3: It is right, but irrelevant.
Phase 4: It is what I had been saying all along.At present, the attitude of the public and of the specialists is
spread over these four attitudes. The situation is dynamically
changing with perceptions moving from one stage to another.
Human perception does not change the reality of oil depletion, but
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‘‘peak oil movement’’ will say that it is important to diffuse
the concept of the impending worldwide peak in order to
accelerate the work on measures able to prevent its negative
consequences. The question is whether the public will actually
react to an event that will likely spread over several years and that
will not be, in itself, spectacular. If history is a guide, it is likely
that the global peak oil will be forgotten in the turmoil of political
events accompanying it. [7,8].
In the following, I will briefly discuss the present situationwith
peak oil, how the concept is spreading, the criticism it generates,
and its likely perspectives in the near future. It may well be that
the peak has already taken place for the so called ‘‘conventional
oil’’; but here I am not going to enter into a specific discussion of
the peak date.2. Stage one: never heard of it
At present, it seems that almost all operators in the field of oil
and fossil fuels have at least heard something about the concept of
peak oil. The idea is also spreading with non specialists and the
general public. A search of the web shows that the term ‘‘peak oil’’
has had a certain success, but that it is still overshadowed by news
about politics, entertainment, and other scientific concepts. In
October 2006, a Google search returns the following results
Google hits
Hollywood 197,000,000
Terrorism 111,000,000
Nanotechnology 26,600,000
Global warming 26,500,000
Peak Oil 4,320,000
Hydrogen economy 1,120,000
Howard [9] has examined the diffusion of the peak oil idea in
the media, finding a hierarchy similar to the one above. The term
‘‘peak oil’’ and similar ones are mentioned in the media orders of
magnitude less frequently than such terms as ‘‘war to terrorism’’
and ‘‘Hollywood’’. Reading the newspaper and watching TV, the
general public has a much different view than that of the people
studying resource depletion. Nevertheless, the concept of peak oil
is fast growing in people’s consciousness. According to Howard
[9], the growth rate of mentions in the media for terms related to
the peak oil concept is of the order of 500–2000% per year and
even more.
The problem is that the diffusion of the idea is accompanied by
a loss of focus onwhat the idea exactly means. As it spreads, ‘‘peak
oil’’ becomes a poorly defined concept. It becomes the focus of
highly pessimistic visions and it risks becoming a cult. This is
clearly counterproductive as it causes strong counter-reactions
based on arguments just as emotional as those of expect the end
of the world from the peak. Still, it is evident that the public
awareness of the concept is destined to increase in the near term.3. Stage two: it is wrong
Facing for the first time the concept that oil production is going
to peak and to decline, the reaction of the public and of experts
alike is one of complete disbelief. Assuming that the concept is
understood, and not trivialized as meaning something like ‘‘the
end of oil is coming’’, a more articulated reaction can take two
main forms; one that Hubbert’s theory itself is wrong, the other
that the data in input are overly pessimistic.Sometimes, the criticism can be simply stated as ‘‘if there is
still oil to be extracted, why should production decline?’’
Apparently, some people cannot understand that extracting oil
from the ground is not like extracting beer from a refrigerator.
Barrels are not all the same and extracting low EROEI oil is not the
same as extracting high EROEI oil. Sometimes, it is pointed out
that not all historical cases of oil production show a bell shaped
curve (e.g. Saudi Arabia) or show double peaks (e.g. Iran or
Russia). Indeed, the assumptions that stand behind the Hubbert
model are based on a free market economy. That is not always the
case, of course, depending on the political situation and the actual
production may stray away from the Hubbert curve [10]. The
multiple peaks observed historically can be often correlated with
abrupt political changes, wars and revolutions. The Hubbert based
models of the world production do not, and cannot, take into
account such events which, however, will often worsen the
situation.
A different kind of criticism is that the price mechanism of a
free market will prevent the peak from occurring. If peak oil gets
close, it is argued, prices will increase. High prices will generate
more investments in exploration and extraction technologies and
this will also increase the amount of oil that will be found and put
on the market. Hence, there will be no peak. This model is often
termed the ‘‘Resource Pyramid’’ and it goes back to Zimmermann
[11]. On this point, it should be noted that there are obvious
differences from a geological point of view in the fact that some
resources are ‘‘graded’’, that is exist in a range of declining
concentrations (such as most metals) and some resources being
‘‘either–or’’ such as oil, which either is present in liquid form, or
not present at all. However, from an economic point of view, all
mineral resources are graded. That is, even for crude oil the cost of
extraction varies smoothly with such factors as depth, size,
quality, location, etc. In principle, therefore, the Resource Pyramid
model should be valid for crude oil, as well. It is a seductive model
since it implies that no mineral resource will ever run out.
However, it does not take into account that in an economy there is
more than just the extraction of mineral resources. If all the
elements of the economy are dynamically considered [12,13], the
result is that the amount of capital that can be transferred to
the extraction of minerals from other sectors of the economy is
limited. At some point, the costs of extraction become too high to
be sustained and the decline must start even though a fraction of
the resources may be left in the ground.
But, by far, the most common criticism made at the peak oil
concept is that the reserves available are so huge that there is no
reason to worry; the peak will come, maybe, but we still have
several decades, or even more, to go [14]. Indeed, the estimation of
the global peak date is often based on a geological assessment of
the available reserves. This assessment is, of course, uncertain
both because of geological uncertainties and because of economic
uncertainties. The latter kind of uncertainty is perhaps more
important since it depends on market prices, something notor-
iously difficult to forecast. Another cause of misunderstanding is
the wide use of reserve/production (R/P) ratio. It claims that
reserves support current production for say 40 years. But it is
absurd to suggest that production can stay flat for so many years
and then stop overnight.
As long as we consider estimates made by professional
geologists, modelling based on the Hubbert curve is robust, in
the sense that the uncertainty in the estimates does not strongly
affect the year predicted for the peak. Unfortunately, nothing
prevents people with no other qualification than that of being able
to put together strings of (more or less) intelligible sentences on a
keyboard from stating that oil is actually ‘‘infinite’’ as it is created
by mysterious abiotic processes in the earth’s mantle. At the same
time, nothing prevents people with no qualifications in geology
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estimates of barrels which have no relation whatsoever with the
real world. Obviously, if the reserves are doubled or tripled (on
paper) the peak may move decades forward.
Geological estimates are often seen as crucial to the peak oil
concept but they are not the only element of the question. Surely
the shape of the production curve depends on the amount of
extractable resources but, in a certain way, the curve ‘‘knows’’
what the extractable amount is and moves on accordingly. In
principle, therefore it should be possible to determine that
amount from the curve without resorting to geological estimates.
For the global oil production, this approach needs a sophisticated
mathematical approach, but it can be done [15]. The result is an
estimate of the amount of extractable oil which matches reason-
ably well with the geological estimates and is therefore a strong
argument for the correctness of these estimates. As a further
point, history has shown that even serious geologists tend to
overestimate oil resources when getting close to the production
peak [16]. This factor may be at work nowadays as well and may
explain some high estimates by institutions which should be—in
principle—reliable (e.g. [17]).
In any case, the strongest argument in favor of the idea that
peaking is going to occur in the near future is to note that peak oil
has already taken place more than 30 years ago. What has taken
place, actually, is not ‘‘peak-production’’, but ‘‘peak-discovery’’. Oil
has to be found before it is produced; it is obvious that the peak of
discovery in the 1960s (a matter of undisputed historical fact)
must deliver a corresponding peak of production, as indeed it
already has in some 50 countries, whose production is falling.
The discovery curve in the figure is obtained by removing the
spurious ‘‘reserve growth’’ effect that derives from the standard
accounting procedures of the oil industry. If the total amount of oil
in a well is plotted as a function of the actual year of discovery, the
result is a peak in discoveries that took place in the 1960s. It is
obvious that before you can extract (produce) oil, you have to
discover it and we know that production of oil may last years or
decades before a well is considered exhausted. So, we are now
extracting oil that was discovered decades ago and the production
curve mirrors the discovery curve [18]. Therefore, a production
peak is unavoidable in the near future (Fig. 1).
The figure does not prove that the discovery curve cannot
invert its decline in the near future, but that can be at most a
temporary phenomenon as shown by the historical data. The
strong rise in oil prices that started in 1973 gave rise, later, to
increased discoveries. Indeed, the effort in exploration for oil was0
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Fig. 1. Historical trends of world prices and discoveries of crude oil. Data courtesy
of the Association for the study of peak oil and gas (ASPO). Oil prices (corrected for
inflation) and discovery rates.stepped up in the 1970s [26]. Nevertheless, the rising discovery
trend soon peaked and abated. The new discoveries peaked
approximately in 1977, much before the peak in oil prices in 1979.
High prices do, apparently, stimulate more discoveries but the
trend cannot be sustained. The problem is that prospecting for oil
requires energy and the EROEI of prospection goes down with
progressive depletion, also because the larger fields are found
first, being too big to miss [19]. Note also how the highest
discovery rates in history were obtained for the lowest historical
prices of oil. High prices, clearly, cannot invert the declining
discovery trend.4. Phase 3: it is true, but irrelevant
Some critics of the concept of peak oil do not question that oil
production will peak and decline in the near future. They
maintain, however, that it will have no effects on the world
economy since the price mechanisms will cause a smooth
transition to alternative energy resources. These alternative
resources may be of three kinds, (1) coal, natural gas or other
fossil fuels, (2) nuclear energy and (3) renewables. Sometimes,
energy saving is classed as an energy ‘‘source’’ and it is maintained
that it will be energy efficiency that will eliminate the effects of
the peak. Discussing these concepts in depth would be, obviously,
too much for the present paper. However, it appears unlikely that
the transition from oil to different resources will be smooth.
Hirsch et al. [20] has examined in detail the possibility of
mitigating the effects of peak oil by using alternative fossil fuels
and various energy saving measures. Hirsch’s analysis is very
conservative in the sense that it totally neglects the effects on the
environment of switching from oil and gas to dirtier fuels such as
those derived from coal or tar sands. Even assuming that we
would be able to pay the high price of pollution and global
warming, Hirsch finds that, if the peak is coming in the near
future, the measures considered would come too late. Likely,
switching to such fuels would not help in the long term, either,
since these are finite resources anyway and subjected to EROEI-
related peaking.
About nuclear energy, the possibility to play a significant role
in the transition will depend on focussing sufficient capital
resources to build a large number of new plants. This depends,
in the end, in the return that these plants can provide and this, in
turn, depends on the EROEI of the technology. The value of the
EROEI of the present nuclear technology is hotly debated, with
reported values that go from less than 1 to more than 50, although
it seems that most estimates tend to place it in the range of 5–10
[21,22]. This EROEI is relatively low and with the high investments
costs involved it appears unlikely that nuclear fission as it is now,
will be able to provide a smooth transition away from crude oil.
However, nuclear technology may somewhat cushion the shock of
peak oil. Of course, fission technology improves with time, but at
the same time the resources of fissionable uranium are being
depleted so that in the long run the prospects of nuclear fission
are poor. Other nuclear technologies such as fusion are at present
under study, but their development as commercial technologies
seems to be far away in time. In addition, the fusion technology
being developed at present uses as fuel a relatively rare isothope
of lithium (6Li). The mineral resources of lithium in the world may
not be abundant enough for a replacement of fossil fuels at the
level of the present level of energy production [23].
The prospects of renewable energies are better under several
respects: technologies such as photovoltaics and wind energy are
available on the market and have acceptable EROEIs: around 20
for wind power [21] and around 10 for PV (see e.g. [24]).
Considering that renewable energy is not subject to depletion,
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progress. Therefore, renewables are very promising and their
growth is very fast [25]. Nevertheless renewables are still far away
from producing amounts of energy comparable to the world
needs. Furthermore, an energy system based on renewables needs
to tackle the problem of energy storage, both daily and seasonal.
Storage technologies are available, but they add further costs. The
resources needed for the transition from fossil fuels to renewables
are immense and it is unlikely that the transition will be smooth.5. Phase four: it is what we had been saying all along
Will we ever arrive at Phase Four in respect to the general
attitude of experts and public alike? Most of the members of the
so called ‘‘peak oil movement’’ are of the opinion that, if the
concept of peak oil was to be generally known and understood,
effective strategies could be developed to counter its negative
effects.
We are clearly moving in that direction but, if the past is a
guide for the present, we may never arrive there. The present
situation repeats under many respects the situation of the United
States in the late 1960s. At that time, the date of Hubbert’s
prediction for the US peak was getting closer and a considerable
debate was taking place among the experts. That debate did not
generate a ‘‘peak oil movement’’ similar to the one existing today,
but it probably affected the general opinion, as shown from the
publication of such books as ‘‘The Limits to Growth’’ [12].
However, the events that followed pushed resource depletion
away from public perception.
When it peaked, in 1971, the US production was around 3.5
billion barrels per year, about 20% of the total world production of
the time. The US peak was a major event of 20th century: a critical
mineral resource going through the production peak in a major
production region. Yet, the wars and the political events that
followed made the US oil peak a non-event; something that was
not mentioned in the media and remained invisible with the
public. The Yom Kippur war of 1973 and the subsequent, short
lived Arab oil embargo were taken as the cause and not as the
consequence of the US oil shortage. With the mid 1980s, the oil
crisis was over, or at least it was perceived to be over as the result
of new fields being brought into production. At that point, the
peaking of the US production slipped away from the world
consciousness. The concept of peak oil was not revived until the
late 1990s, when a group of oil geologists founded the Association
for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO).6. Conclusion
At present, we are facing an uncertain world political situation.
If a major war were to erupt in the Middle East region that would
surely have effects on the already strained world oil market that
could be much worse than those of the Yom Kippur war of 1973.
A war would not cause peak oil, but it would enhance the high
prices and shortages associated with it. It may well happen that
these high prices and shortages would be attributed by the public
to political events and not to geological ones. The evolution of
these tendencies might even lead to a general rejection of the
peak oil concept, as it happened with the discussion of the firstedition of ‘‘The Limits of Growth’’ [12] in a debate that took place
several years ago. That could be a disaster if it would lead to
misunderstanding the causes of the catastrophe and concentrate
the remaining resources for further wars instead of using them for
developing technologies useful to counter the effects of peak oil.
In the present confused situation, it may well happen that the
global peaking of oil production will become an epochal non-
event for the public. However, that will not be the case for its
consequences.
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